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Helter's "New Dimensions of
Political Economy
THE GODKIN Lectures that Professor Walter Heller
gave at Harvard University in March 1968 are expanded in his
lively book on "New Dimensions of Political Economy." Its
central theme is the use of economics in the formation of na-
tional policies during the 1960's—a period and subject of
which Professor Heller has exceptional firsthand knowledge.
The first chapter deals with the role of economists, particularly
the Council of Economic Advisers, in shaping economic po11-
cies and in advancing the President's program. The second
chapter discusses the tools and achievements of the "new eco-
nomics" since 1961 and "the promise of modem economic
policy" for the future. The third and final chapter is devoted
to a close examination of the opportunities that growing fed-
eral revenues provide for strengthening the fiscal foundations
of hard-pressed state and local governments. Clearly, Professor
Heller deals with issues of large significance for the modem
world.
His book has other notable qualities. It is humane in spirit
and is concerned with the business of life, not merely economic
improvement. It presents a lucid and stirring account of the
Review of New Dimensions of Political Economy, by Walter W. Heller.
Reprinted, by permission, from The National Banking Review, June 1967.304The Business Cycle in a Changing World
"neweconomics" in action. It argues eloquently for a strongly
activist economic policy, particularly in fiscal matters. It is in-
formed by a thorough understanding of the political process. It
seeks to avoid ideological conflict or commitment. And it yields
interesting glimpses of the two presidents whom Professor
Heller served so ably as Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers. For all these reasons the book deserves to be read
widely.
Not all of the book, however, deserves to be remembered,
and the main reason is the author's neglect of history. Govern-
mental concern with economic growth is hardly an offspring of
the "new economics." In the nineteenth century, economic
growth was a paramount objective of our nation's policy—as
the debates and legislation on tariffs, internal improvements,
banking and currency, land settlement, conservation, and the
state of competition testify. With industrialization and urbani-
zation proceeding rapidly, the business cycle naturally became
a subject of large public concern toward the end of the cen-
tury. Much attention was therefore directed in succeeding de-
cades, first to the prevention of financial crises, later to the
moderation of fluctuations in the general price level, still later
to the prevention of mass unemployment. After World War
II, as the nation's resolve to deal with unemployment became
stronger and as evidence that the business cycle was moderat-
ing accumulated, interest shifted again to economic growth
and economic policy became increasingly focused on the
simultaneous achievement, as far as feasible, of full employ-
ment, a high rate of growth in productivity, and general price
stability. The Economic Report of the President in January
1954 stated the modem view accurately: "The new concept
that is emerging in the practical art of government...isto
subject every act of proposed legislation or administrative de-
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standpointof the contribution it is likely to make, whether in
the immediate or a more distant future, to the attainment of an
expanding economy with maximum employment and without
price inflation" (Economic Report, p. 112).
Professor Belier brushes aside what happened before the
1960's. He conveys the impression that, at least during the
1950's, the "old mythology and wrong-headed economics" of
the budget dominated economic policy (p. 36). He at no time
mentions the huge tax cut, or the provisions for accelerated
depreciation, or the highway legislation, or the reform of the
social security program, or the concern with education and
training programs during the Eisenhower years. He notes, to
be sure, the restrictive financial policy of 1958—60, but does
not refer to the urgent circumstances from which it arose. "At
the 1966 Symposium on the Employment Act," he tells us,
"there was much talk of the gradual evolution of economic
policy...Butevolution became revolution the moment we
had Presidents—and now we have had two—with the Keyne-
sian perception to welcome their responsibilities under the act
and to use its mandate and the weapons of political economy
to generate ...prosperity"(p. 12). This vision of a revolu-
tion is indeed suggested by the very first sentence of the book:
"Economics has come of age in the 1960's." Again, Professor
Heller speaks of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as "the first
modem economists in the American Presidency" (p. 36)—a
claim that appears to be largely based on their advocacy of a
massive tax cut at a time when the economy was advancing
and the budget was out of balance. This was undoubtedly a
new, significant, and at the time a salutary departure in eco-
nomic policy. But if the first modern economist in the presi-
dency is to be identified at all, may not this title belong to
President Truman who fought so valiantly for the passage of
the Employment Act or perhaps to President Hoover who, de-306TheBusiness Cycle in a Changing World
spite his tragic inadequacy in a time of crisis, was the first in-
cumbent of the White House to deem it essential to use gov-
ernmental power to moderate the ill winds of the business
cycle?
Between 1961 and 1966, production and employment in our
country rose substantially, the advance of prosperity became
widely diffused, full employment was reestablished, and new
doors of economic opportunity were opened to underprivi-
leged citizens. Professor Heller stresses these achievements and
he is right in claiming that the federal government played a
vital part in bringing about these gains. However, he glosses
over the disappointments of the '60's—the fact that extensive
unemployment lasted much too long; the fact that disequilib-
rium in the balance of payments escaped correction; the fact
that governmental finances continued to show a deficit even
when full employment was reestablished; and the fact that
governmental policy released forces which eventually resulted
in a new round of inflation.
Professor Heller properly assigns a high role to fiscal policy,
particularly the tax cut of 1964, in the prosperity of recent
years. But his view that the expansion was "fiscally spurred"
(p. 68) is an oversimplification which fails, in particular, to
recognize the strongly expansionist thrust of monetary policy
from 1961 to 1965. He claims that the "chief reliance" (p. 95)
of fiscal policy during 1961—65 was tax reduction, when in
fact expenditure increases came to a much larger total than tax
reduction. He conveys the impression that President Kennedy's
proposal to cut income tax rates worked out precisely as
planned, but fails to mention that the tax proposal was accom-
panied by a plan to raise federal expenditures by neaAy $5 bil-
lion and that the Congress accepted the former but rejected
the latter. And he is surely mistaken in suggesting that Viet-
nam is responsible for the recent inflation. Many months be-"New Dimensions of Political Economy" 307
foreVietnam was of any financial consequence, evidence of
economic strain began to appear—particularly, although by no
means exclusively, in the markets for raw materials and skilled
labor. Signs of incipient pressure on the nation's available re-
sources, which were already plain during 1964, were ignored
or overlooked by the policymakers. In fact, during 1965, with
Vietnam beginning to hurt and the economy approaching full
employment, the federal government unleashed practically
every weapon of economic stimulation—greater monetary
ease, lower income tax rates for individuals, lower income tax
rates for corporations, lower excise taxes, and larger spending
on programs of the Great Society.
The theory of the "new economics" has a fascination for the
modern generation because of its intellectual elegance and
scorn of evil—the evil of inflation no less than the evil of un-
employment. In Professor Heller's words, the "success of the
'new economics'...requireswillingness to shift or reverse
gears" (p. 99). More precisely, "flexibility of program calls for
a readiness to move taxes and interest rates up as inflation
pressures mount and down as demand ebbs" (p. 100). But this
fine rule of symmetry was practiced unevenly by policymakers
during the 1960's—as it had indeed been before them, thereby
strengthening the fears of many that the "new economics" may
in practice be just another engine of inflation. Even now, Pro-
fessor Heller does not stop to ponder or even to note the fact
that the wholesale price level rose 4 per cent between mid-
1964 and the end of 1965. Even now, he believes that eco-
nomic conditions required "overt fiscal stimulus" (P. 95) dur-
ing 1965. Even now, while he takes pride in the boldly
expansionist policy that was pursued when unemployment was
extensive, he explains the hesitations of fiscal policy during
1966 on the simple ground that "the economic calculus was
clouded by uncertainty" (p. 88).308The Business Cycle in a Changing World
Prof essor Heller professes little interest in the business cycle.
"Cone is the countercyclical syndrome of the 1950's," he an-
flounces in the Preface. Later, he explains that closing of the
gap between actual and potential output "rather than the
smoothing of the business cycle became the main preoccupa-
tion of policy" (p. 64); and that "the main instrument for de-
throning the cyclical model and enthroning the growth model
has been the GNP or performance gap" (p. 62). Apart from
language, I am unaware of any real difference between "gap-
closing" and "smoothing of the business cycle" provided, of
course, that the smoothing is substantial and occurs at a high
level of the employment rate. There is no real difference here
between the objectives of economic policy during the 1960's
and the objectives during the 1950's. However, "enthroning the
growth model" cannot of itself rid the economy of the pro-
cesses stressed by business-cycle theory—for example, the im-
balance that normally develops between capital investment
and consumption or between costs and prices as the economy
moves toward full employment. The "cyclical model" therefore
serves a diagnostic purpose and its neglect can prove serious,
as it indeed has. Fortunately, "the countercycical syndrome of
the 1950's" is not yet entirely "gone." It has not even been en-
tirely abandoned by Professor Heller, for he too recognizes the
need "to avoid the excesses that destroy expansions" (p. 49).
The unique function of the Council of Economic Advisers, in
Professor Heller's well-chosen words, is "to put at the Presi-
dent's disposal the best facts, appraisals, and forecasts that
economic science, statistics, and surveys can produce"
(p.
16).
But, as he explains, the activities of the Council extend beyond
giving advice to the President himself. Professor Heller dis-
cusses perceptively the activities of the Council since 1961, but
he again fails to do justice to earlier history. He conveys the
impression that prior to 1961 the Council pursued a "detached,"New Dimensions of Political Economy309
Olympian,take-it-or-leave-it approach to Presidential eco-
nomic advice" (p. 15)Thisdescription may fit the brief pe-
riod when Dr. Nourse was Chairman of the Council. Other-
wise, it is simply untrue. During 1953—56, for example, the
Chairman of the Council had weekly scheduled meetings with
the President—a privilege that only one other member of the
government, the Secretary of Defense, enjoyed. He had full
access to the President at other times and he used it when
necessary. He represented the Council at weekly Cabinet
meetings, made frequent reports on current and emerging
policy requirements, and participated actively in Cabinet de-
bates on economic matters. He served as Chairman of various
Cabinet committees and used the opportunity to advance the
Council's program. He worked closely with the Secretary of
the Treasury and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.
He and his Council colleagues spent a good part of practically
every day striving for a consensus on policy issues with repre-
sentatives of the various departments and agencies. The Coun-
cil thus fought tirelessly within the Executiveestablishment for
the policies that it deemed needed and proper. The Council
did not, however, take to the stump and fight in the public
arena for the President's program. It refrained from this essen-
tial political activity because it felt, by and large, that profes-
sional economists should suck to their knitting, that economic
counseling and political advocacy could get in one another's
way, and that economists should not devote their precious time
to do what politicians—who at least then were not in short
supply—can do better.
En other periods, both before and after President Eisen-
1professorHeller has written me as follows: "Because of the context
in which they were put, these words apparently conveyed the wrong im-
pression. They were meant to apply to Dr. Nourse's well-known, but
unique, concept of Presidential economic advice,"310The Business Cycle in a Changing World
hower's first administration, the Council did indeed choose to
play a large and active public role. Since 1961, as Professor
Heller explains in detail, the Council has considered its advi-
sory responsibility to include public advocacy of the Presi-
dent's program and even the occasional release of trial balloons
in his behalf. It may not be easy to decide, on the basis of evi-
dence yet available, whether such activities seriously interfere
with the objectivity and receptiveness to new thought and
fresh evidence that the Council needs to have. It is still useful,
however, to remember that political activities on the part of
the Council nearly led to its destruction not too many years
ago.
Whatever view one may take of Professor Heller's treatment
of the past, his views concerning the future are always impor-
tant. His plea for revenue sharing with the states and localities
is well reasoned and well documented. It has already aroused
wide interest in the Congress and will inevitably become a
subject of lively debate once the pressure of Vietnam on the
federal budget eases. Professor Heller also makes an impres-
sive plea for flexibility and speed in fiscal action. Since changes
in tax rates affect swiftly the income structure, he feels that
"high-speed income tax legislation, quickly translated into
changes in withholding and quarterly payment rates, would
give the Federal Reserve Board a run for its money in timely
stabilization policy" (p. 102). This is difficult to achieve under
our form of government, and the subject deserves the most
careful thought and study—as Professor Heller urges.
Candor compels me to add that my enthusiasm for high-
speed tax legislation, which was once considerable, has waned
in recent years. I am not at all confident, by way of example,
that fiscal policy in early 1966 would have been less hesitant if
"pushbutton procedures or Presidential authority for tempo-
rary tax increases" (p. 98) had been available. With such de-"New Dimensions of Political Economy" 311
vicesat hand, we might very well have had a "quickie tax cut"
in the summer of 1962, such as the Council then recommended
(p. 33). But in that event, would we have gotten the judicious
and well-balanced Revenue Act of 1964 which became law
only after Congress had worked long and conscientiously on
the economic, ethical, and administrative issues surrounding
the income tax? Besides doubts of this character, I do not think
that economic forecasting is as yet sufficiently accurate to jus-
tify fine fiscal tuning. I also fear that if it ever becomes govern-
mental policy to move income taxes up or down at brief inter-
vals, this rule of fiscal behavior will become a normal part of
expectations and the effectiveness of fiscal policy in inducing
needed changes in investment and consumer spending will
therefore be drastically reduced. Thus, if a tax reduction is
deemed to be temporary, it will affect economic activity only
through its effect on current disposable income and the spend-
ing response may be quite small. On the other hand, if the tax
reduction is expected to be permanent, both individuals and
corporations will not only be more willing to commit their
larger disposable income, but they are also apt to use their
brains, theft energy, their liquid resources, and even theft
credit to take advantage of the new environment in which
business is to be done. These considerations argue against fre-
quent changes, but not necessarily against speedy changes, of
tax rates. It would be helpful to learn what we can from the
experience of Great Britain, Canada, and perhaps other coun-
tries where quick tax legislation has been practiced.
Let me say, in closing, that Professor Heller's optimism and
his compassionate concern with both the present and future
are perhaps the most engaging features of his book. His faith
in the power and promise of the "new economics" is strong.
The following is it typical utterance: "I count on our growing
economic maturity to keep on lowering the political barriers to312The Business Cycle in a Changing World
sound economic decisions" (p. 97). But Professor Heller is
realistic enough to recognize that the path of the "new eco-
nomics" is strewn with rocks in practice. His warning that "if
fiscal and monetary policies are consistently less vigorous in
checking overexpansion than in combatting underexpansion,
the resulting inflationary bias could in part discredit the 'new
economics" (p. 50) is timely and constructive.